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NOTES

BAILMENT LEASES IN PENNSYLVANIA
To the student of Pennsylvania law it seems hardly necessary to point out in
detail the importance of the bailment lease in Pennsylvania. However, a brief
discussion of its importance and use may not be devoid of usefulness.
A distinction between a bailment lease and a conditional sale usually arises
when creditors of the bailee seek to attach chattels which a:e in his possession fol
debts due them. The difficulty arises in view of the fact that both transactions accomplish the same end, namely a reservation of a special property interest in the seller until the buyer has fully paid the purchase price of the chattel. Under the law
of most states, iAcluding Pennsylvania, a conditional sale had to be made a part
of the public record before it was valid, and enforceable against the judgment
creditors of the vendee. A bailment lease, on the other hand, did not have to be
recorded.
It was, therefore, argued by the opponents of the bailment lease that in view
of the fact that the vendee was cloaked with the most important indicia of ownership, namely possession, that the courts judicially countenanced a perpetration
of fraud upon creditors when they recognize the distinction between a bailment
lease and a conditional sale.
The framers of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, therefore, saw fit to incude a bailment lease within the definition of a conditional sale. 1
The courts of Pennsylvania, however, were not too impressed with the arguments against the bailment lease and answer that the very nature of life necessarily
requires the use of bailments; but caution, furthermore, that while they recognize
the necessity of bailment leases they will look to the intent of the parties rather
than the nomenclature used in determining whether a given set of facts is tantamount to a bailment lease or a conditional sale.
The legislative branch of the Commonwealth apparently agrees with the
arguments of the courts in view of the fact that when adopting the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act as a part of the law of the Commonwealth subsection 2 of
section 1 which defined bailment leases as conditional sales was expressly omitted
2
from the Act of Assembly.
A bailment lease has been defined as a commercial transaction whereby the
owner of a chattel gives it to another under an agreement of transfer which contains these essentials: a lease (1) for a definite term; (2) at a definite rental;
(3) with a provision that the chattel is to be returned to the owner at the termination of the term unless the bailee; (4) exercises his option to buy the chattel upon
the payment of the entire rental and perhaps upon the payment of an additional
sum, notwithstanding the fact that it may be nominal. Moreover, the lease must be
(5) for use and not for sale. 3
1 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 1 (2).

2 Act of 1925, May 12, P.L. 603, 69 P.S. 361.
3 Stern and Company v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. 112, (1929).
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The writer proposes to examine the extent to which the appellate courts
of Pennsylvania have adhered to or have d'eparted from this definition in the
judicial determination of whether a given set of facts amount to a bailment lease
or a conditional sale. The problem will be approached by an examination of the
decision to determine the necessity or non-necessity of the presence of the above
enumerated elements.
(1) For a definite term. In Stiles v. Seaton 4 the trustees of the bankrupt attempted to recover certain personal property which the bankrupt, by the terms of
the agreement, "agrees to rent" and the defendant "agrees to hire" at a monthly
rental of $500.00, with the added stipulation that if and when the amount of rent
paid shall amount to $9,880.70, title to the property shall vest in the defendants,

the purported lessees.
It will be noted that the agreement does not contain an 'express stipulation
for a definite term nor does it contain a stipulation for a return of the property in
the event of a default in payments or violations of certain express covenants.
The trial court construed the document as a bailment lease, which judgment
was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court said, "But while both these provisions are important and sometimes controlling evidence of the intentions of

the parties in executing the instrument, neither is essential to the existence of a
bailmrent." The Court then added in this event the instrument is to be construed as
a lease at will.

In Summerson v. Hicks, 5 the Supreme Court reversed the trial court which
had construed the agreement as a bailment lease. The purported lease of the prop-

erty contained a stipulation for the payment of a certain sum of money on or before
April 1. The lease also provided that ownership was to remain in the purported

lessor until the full payment was made as well as the fact that the owner was entitled
to possession of the chattel upon default in payments.

While it is admitted that the opinion was principally based upon the expressed
stipulation that ownership was to remain in the lessor which the court interpreted
as indicative of a conditional sale, it is nonetheless true that the court made mention

of the fact that no definite term was set forth in the agreement. It is, therefore,
submitted that while the necessity of a definite term was mentioned by way of
dicta, the Supreme Court indicated that a definite term was essential to a bailment

lease and, if necessary, would have reversed solely on that ground.
In Leatherman v. Moyer,6 the plaintiff was in possession of three cows under

an agreement which called for the payment of $355.00 to the defendant within one
month until which payment the title to the cows remained in the defendant. The
court noted that the agreement failed to state a definite term of bailment and after
4 Stiles v. Seaton, 200 Pa. 114, 49 Atd. 774

(1901).
5 Sumrnmerson v. Hicks, 134 Pa. 566, 19 Atl. 808 (1890).
6 Leatherman v. Moyer, 104 Pa. Super. 363, 15 Atd. 622 (1931).
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favorably quoting Stern v. Paul, supra, decided that the agreement was a conditional sale and not a bailment lease.
It will be noted that in Summerson v. Hicks, decided in 1890, the Supreme
Court by very strong and pointed dicta, indicated that a definite term was necessary
to a bailment lease while the same court in Stiles v. Seaton, 1901, said a definite
term was not essential to a bailment lease. In Leatherman v. Moyer, 1931, the
Superior Court indicated that a definite term was essential to a bailment lease.
Thus it is seen that the Supreme Court disregarded one of its previous decisions,
while making no mention of the previous decision in the latter opinion, and the
Superior Court disregarding the later Supreme Court decision and following the
pointed dictum of the earlier Supreme Court decision.
Definite Rental: There is at least one Pennsylvania case in which the agreement did not contain a definite rental and the court nevertheless construed it as a
bailment lease. In Chamberlain v. Smith, 7 the agreement called for the delivery of
oxen to the purported lessee to keep and work for a term of one year upon the
completion of which the cattle were to be returned to the purported lessor. The
agreement further provided, however, that the purported lessee could obtain title
to the cattle by payment of $40.00.
In discussing the provision regarding the payment of the $40.00 to obtain
title, the court 'emphatically said that the agreement was an offer to sell with an
extended time in which to accept the offer. It will be noted, however, that the agreement is devoid of any provision for payment, as rental, if the lessee does not elect to
purchase the oxen. It is submitted that the agreement does not contemplate a
definite rental, in fact no rental whatsoever, and the transaction was a conditional
sale rather than a bailment lease.
No Pennsylvania cases have been found in which an agreement was held to
be a bailment lease if it did not contemplate a definite rental. Many cases, however, set forth the stipulation regarding a definite rental as an essential element
8
of a bailment lease.
When one considers that a bailment lease is essentially a bailment for the
mutual benefit of the bailor and bailee in that it usually contemplates a transfer
of title and in addition that the so-called rental payments are deducted from the
purchase price, it seems logical that the bailee should pay a definite rental for use
of the chattel and not a lump sum if he elects to purchase the chattel. It is, therefore, submitted that a stipulation for rental of the chattel is a most consistent, if
not absolutely essential, 'element of the very nature of the bailment lease.
No Return: In Farquharv. McAlevy, 9 the court remarked, "Itlacked the
7 Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. 431 (1863).
8 Porter v. Duncan, 23 Pa. Super. 58, (1903.);
243, 33 Atd. 331, (1895) ; Lippincott v. Scott,
Williams, 130 Pa. Super. 100, 196 At. 910
Super. 165, 18 A.2d, 680 (1941).
9 Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. 233, Ad. 811

Collins v. Bellefonte Railroad Company, 171 Pa.
198 Pa. 283, 47 Atd. 1115, (1901) ; Decker v.
(1938); W. K. Wetherill v. Scheffel, 144 Pa.
(1891).
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essential feature of a bailment, viz., a stipulation for a return of the property at the
end of the term." This case as far as can be determined has not been overruled in
Pennsylvania.
There are, however, two relatively recent Superior Court decisions, namely,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hartman'0 and Kindig v. Wertz,,'
in both of which the matter was discussed and the court said that a provision for return of the chattel upon completion of the term was not necessary to a bailment lease.
In the latter case, the court quoted Enlow v. Klein 12 in which it was said, "neither
is a stipulation for the return of the property on the expiration of the time during
which the bailment is operative necessary, for if it is not returned the bailor may
resort to his legal remedies, and thus enforce his contract."
Thus it is seen that the two d'ecisions of the Superior Court have elected to
follow Enlow v. Klein while totally disregarding a Supreme Court decision which
seems to hold the contrary view.
It must be admitted that the Hartman case contained only dictum to this effect;
such dictum did, however, appear to be rather definite and seemed to leave no doubt
as to the position of the Court on this matter.
It is submitted that the requirement that the bailment lease should contain
such a stipulation is not without foundation in view of the fact that the very
nature of a bailment contemplates a return of the property upon the termination of
the period of the bailment and notwithstanding the fact that the bailee may exercise his option to purchase the property.
Option to Buy: An option may be defined as a right which one person has and
for which he has given sufficient consideration to purchase, if he chooses, withi;i
a given period certain property interests of another.
The Pennsylvania cases do not require that the buyer have a technical option
in order to construe the agreement as a bailment lease. According to the appellate
decisions of the Commonwealth an agreement will be construed as a bailment
lease even though the seller is to merely execute a bill of sale to the buyer upon
the r'eceipt of the final payment.
In Ditman v. Cottrell,13 the lessor rented a certain printing press to lessee
for a definite term at a definite rental and upon the expiration of the term provided that all covenants have been kept the lessor agreed to execute a bill of sale to
the lessee. The Court in a per curiam opinion affirmed the judgment of the lower
court which had held the agreement to be a bailment lease.
In Kindig v. Wertz, 4 the plaintiff's testator entered into an agreement witt!
defendant's intestate whereby the intestate agreed to lease certain mules to testator
for a definite period at a definite rental. It was also agreed that the mules shall be10

General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hartman, 114 Pa. Super. 544, 174 Atl. 795 (1934).
11 Kindig v. Wertz, 116 Pa. Super. 456, 176 AtI. 769 (1935).
12 Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 488 (1876),
13 Ditman v. Cottrell, 125 Pa. 606, 17 At]. 504 (1889).
14 Kindig v. Wertz, 116 Pa. Super. 456, 176 Ati. 769 (1935).
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come the property of the testator if, and only if, the full payments were made. The
court held such an arrangement to be an option to buy and a bailment lease.
Another interesting situation is seen in Dando v. Foulds.15 The lessor agreed
to lease certain chattels to lessee for a definite period at a definite rental. The agreement further provided that at the expiration of the term the lessor would sell
and the lessee would buy the chattels in question.
It is noteworthy that the agreement did not contain an option to buy but
rather a stipulation whereby the lessor had a contractual duty to sell and the lessee
a contractual duty to buy the l'eased chattels. Nevertheless, the court determined
that the agreement was a bailment lease.
It is therefore seen from a consideration of the above cases that the courts
of Pennsylvania are rather lenient in determining the existence of an option to
buy. It is submitted that the courts will find an option to buy, at least in name, as
long as the lessee is to gain title at any time during or upon the completion of the
term of bailment. The courts, moreover, do not concern themselves with the manner
by which the lessee is to gain title. He may even have a contractual duty to do so
and upon failure to perform may be found liable in an action of assumpsit.
For Use and Not For Sale: In determining whether the agreement constituted
a bailment for use as distinguished from a bailment for sale, one finds that it is
sometimes most difficult to precisely determine the intent of the parties. This is so
becausle in both a bailment lease and a conditional sale there is always a superimposed agreement which calls for the transfer of title at some future date.
While the courts have not judicially defined what is meant by the term, "for use
and not for sale," it is apparent from a reading of the cases that the agreement must
not on its face constitute a sale ab initio but must rather call for a bailment with
an option to purchase at some future date.
In Forrest v. Nelson Bros. and Co.,16 the agreement stated that the owner
of eighteen looms "has agreed to sell" them to one Andrews for a certain price payable in four installments which became due on certain dates. The agreement stipulated that as each loom was paid for a bill of sale for that loom would be given to
Andrews. The looms were to be delivered to Andrews and used by him in his
business, and the plaintiff, the owner, had the right to repossess the looms upon
the breach of any covenant. The court determined that the agreement was a conditional sale and in its opinion placed emphasis upon the fact that by the terms of
the agreement Forrest "has agreed to sell" and, furthermore, that Andrews was to
insure the goods in the name of Forrest. Both of these stipulations, the court said, are
incompatible with the nature of a bailment lease and are indicative of a conditional
sale.
15 Dando v. Foulds, 105 Pa. 74, (1884).
16 Forrest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. 481, (1885).
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In the more recent case of Hoeveler-Stutz Company v. Cleveland Motor Sales,1

the court said that when autombiles are given to a franchise holder for the purpose
of resale by him to the general public, the agreement is a conditional sale and not a
bailment lease, notwithstanding the fact that the parties referred to it as a tease.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The plaintiff, a district distributor
of Stutz autombiles, under an agreement with the defendant, by the terms of which
the defendant agreed to purchase cars from the distributor, delivered ten cars
to the defendant. Although the terms of the original agreement called for payment
on delivery or on presentation of a sight draft with the bill of lading attached,
the plaintiff attempted to make a credit sale secured by a bailment lease.
In condemning the transaction the court said that one of the necessary elements of a bailment lease is that the subject matter must be given for the use of
the bailee and not for sale by him to any third party. The court also pointed out that
if such an agreement was condoned, the purchaser from the dealer would be
"an unwitting guarantor of the credit of his dealer."
In Johnstown Automobile v. Read, 18 the plaintiff delivered a car to one

Myers under a bailment lease for a period of thirty days. Myers pledged the car
as security for a loan made to him by defendant who later gained possession of the
car. In an action of replevin, the court construed the transaction as a bailment lease
notwithstanding the fact that the bailment was one for sale and not for use.
It is interesting to note that this case was decided about two months after
the Stern cas'e, supra, in which the same court said an essential element of a bailment lease is the fact that it must be for use and not for sale. The doctrine of the
Read case was subsequently approved in Sunbury Finance Company v. Boyd Motor
Company,19 as well as in CommercialBanking Corporationv. Active Loan Company
20
of Philadelphia.

Thus it is seen that while the Superior Court said in the Stern case, supra,
that an essential element of a bailment lease was the fact that the bailment must
be for use and not for sale, the courts make an exception in the case of an automobile
franchise wherein the distributor gives the dealer possession of cars under a bailment lease. The relation between the distributor and dealer is said to be a conditional sale because the bailment is one for sale and not for use.
If, however, the dealer pledges the car as security for his own debt, the
transaction between the distributor and the dealer is said to be a bailment lease so
as to protect the distributor in an action of replevin against the pledgee of the
dealer.
James A. Nelson
17 Hoeveler-Stutz Company v. Cleveland Motor Sales, 92 Pa. Super. 425 (1927).
18 The Johnstown Automobile Company v. Read, 96 Pa. Super. 143 (1929).

19 Sunbury Finance Company v. Boyd Motors Company, 119 Pa. Super. 412, 180 At. 103, (1935).
20 Commercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Company of Philadelphia, 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d
616, (1938).

